Insolubility Theorems and EPR Argument by Bacciagaluppi, Guido
Insolubility Theorems and EPR Argument
Guido Bacciagaluppi∗
19 May 2012
Abstract
I present a very general and simple argument — based on the
no-signalling theorem — showing that within the framework of the
unitary Schro¨dinger equation it is impossible to reproduce the phe-
nomenological description of quantum mechanical measurements (in
particular the collapse of the state of the measured system) by assum-
ing a suitable mixed initial state of the apparatus. The thrust of the
argument is thus similar to that of the ‘insolubility theorems’ for the
measurement problem of quantum mechanics (which, however, focus
on the impossibility of reproducing the macroscopic measurement re-
sults). Although I believe this form of the argument is new, I argue
it is essentially a variant of Einstein’s reasoning in the context of the
EPR paradox — which is thereby illuminated from a new angle.
1 Von Neumann’s insolubility argument
In 1932, J. von Neumann provided one of the earliest and most famous
discussions of the measurement process, in chapter VI of his Mathemati-
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cal Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (von Neumann 19321). After setting
up the problem and discussing composite systems in the first two sections,
von Neumann begins his crucial section 3 with an argument ‘to exclude an
often proposed possibility for explaining the statistical character of process
1’ (p. 437), where von Neumann’s ‘process 1’ (which he defines on p. 351) is
the collapse upon measurement of the quantum state of a system.
The kind of putative explanation von Neumann has in mind appears to
be the following.2 Assume that the measuring apparatus is initially in some
appropriate mixed state ρ. For any initial (pure) state |ψ〉〈ψ| of the system,
the final state evolving unitarily from the initial |ψ〉〈ψ|⊗ρ will also be mixed:
U(|ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ ρ)U−1 . (1)
Could our initial ignorance of the apparatus state explain the final mixture
of apparently collapsed states? This idea (before he proceeds to refute it) is
formulated by von Neumann as follows (pp. 437–438):
Let I be the observed system, II the observer. [...] The statistical
character comes from the fact that while indeed I was in a homo-
geneous state3 before the measurement, II instead was a mixture
— and the character of mixture of II has ‘infected’ I+ II during
the course of the interaction, in particular has made a mixture
of the projection in I. That is: the result of the measurement is
indeterminate because the state of the observer before the mea-
surement is not precisely known. It might be conceivable that
such a mechanism works [...]
Or is it? To fix ideas, take the case of an ideal measurement of electron
spin in some given direction. We are asking whether we can construct a
1Page references are to the 1955 translation (which I have mostly tacitly amended).
2It is less apparent to whom von Neumann attributes such an explanation. Who are
the ones who ‘often proposed’ it? (See also the discussion in section 4.)
3The 1955 translation has ‘I was in a (unique) state’, but the German ‘einheitlich’
is used by von Neumann explicitly as a synonym for ‘rein’, i.e. ‘pure’, in which case it
is generally translated as ‘homogeneous’ (see e.g. the definition of a ‘homogeneous or
pure’ expectation functional on p. 307). Clearly, von Neumann here means a pure state,
represented by a projection |ψ〉〈ψ|.
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Hilbert space H describing an apparatus,4 together with a unitary evolution
U for the total system of electron and apparatus, an initial apparatus state
ρ, and a finest ignorance-interpretable decomposition
ρ =
∫
Λ
wλρλdλ (2)
of ρ, such that for any initial state
|ψ〉 = α|+〉+ β|−〉 (3)
of the system, there is a partition Λ = Λ+ ∪Λ−, generally dependent on |ψ〉,
such that ∫
Λ+
wλdλ = |α|2,
∫
Λ−
wλdλ = |β|2 , (4)
and for all λ ∈ Λ±,
U(|ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ ρλ)U−1 = |±〉〈±| ⊗ σ± , (5)
where the σ± represent distinct readings of the apparatus.
Von Neumann’s own argument to the contrary is that, assuming the rel-
evant decomposition of the final state (1) to be of the form∑
wn|ψn〉〈ψn| ⊗ |ϕn〉〈ϕn| (6)
(where the |ψn〉 denote the eigenstates of the measured observable, and the
|ϕn〉 are some orthonormal set of apparatus states5), the weights in this
decomposition are uniquely determined by the weights in the orthogonal
decomposition of the initial apparatus state ρ, and are thus independent of
the state |ψ〉 (in our example, this is inconsistent with (4)). This is true of
any decomposition of this form, since the weights are unique up to ordering
(pp. 438–439).
4Since the evolution of the total system is unitary, the total system needs to be closed,
and we need to include in the apparatus anything with which the system will interact
directly or indirectly. That is, we need to include in the apparatus also all the relevant
parts of the environment. For the sake of brevity, however, we shall usually just talk about
the ‘apparatus’.
5Presumably, the microscopic states of the apparatus corresponding to different read-
ings need to be orthogonal, but will not form a basis of the (very high-dimensional)
apparatus Hilbert space.
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To avoid confusion and for further reference (in particular when we discuss
Brown (1986) in the next section), it will be useful to distinguish between
three different claims, only one of which is von Neumann’s target. Let us
call the triple (H, U, ρ) a measurement scheme, for brevity. Then the three
claims are:
(i) For any |ψ〉 there exist a measurement scheme (H, U, ρ) and a finest
ignorance-interpretable decomposition of ρ that explain the phenomeno-
logical collapse, in the sense that there is a partition of the elements
of the decomposition leading with the probabilities (4) to the collapsed
states (5).
(ii) There exists a measurement scheme (H, U, ρ) such that for any |ψ〉 there
exists a finest ignorance-interpretable decomposition of ρ that explains
the phenomenological collapse in the above sense.
(iii) There exist a measurement scheme (H, U, ρ) and a finest ignorance-
interpretable decomposition of ρ that explain the phenomenological
collapse for any |ψ〉.
Claim (i) is clearly not von Neumann’s target, because it is trivially true
(and thus impossible to rule out). Furthermore, it would be ‘conspiratorial’,
in the sense that the measurement scheme is allowed to depend on the initial
state of the system to be measured, but one’s intuition is that the apparatus
cannot know in advance what state of the system to expect.6
Claim (ii) is a stronger claim (thus one can conceive of trying to rule it
out), but it does not seem to correspond to von Neumann’s verbal statement
of the problem. And indeed, since the finest ignorance-interpretable decom-
position of ρ fixes the set of possible initial apparatus states that are invoked
to explain the different measurement results, letting this decomposition de-
pend on the state |ψ〉 of the system to be measured means that in general
the actual initial state of the apparatus will depend on |ψ〉. But that would
be equally conspiratorial.
6It is interesting to consider whether such apparently conspiratorial dependencies might
be explainable in retrocausal terms (see e. g. Price 1996), but this is clearly not a strategy
von Neumann was considering.
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Thus, von Neumann’s target must, indeed, be claim (iii), as sketched
above. It is the strongest claim, and the easiest to rule out. It should
be noted, however, that von Neumann’s assumption that the ignorance-
interpretable decomposition of the final state is of the form (6) essentially
constrains this decomposition uniquely, so that allowing the decomposition
to depend on |ψ〉 does not make the claim more general. That is, in the re-
stricted context of von Neumann’s own proof, the distinction between claims
(ii) and (iii) is not significant. It only becomes so in the context of later
generalisations of von Neumann’s result, and it is to these we now turn.
2 Insolubility theorems
Over the years, several physicists and philosophers have proved various gen-
eralisations of von Neumann’s result, which are collectively known in the
foundations literature as ‘insolubility theorems’ for the measurement problem
of quantum mechanics.7 There are some differences that are worth spelling
out, however, between von Neumann’s original argument and most of the
later ones.
First of all, recall that the phenomenological description of (ideal) mea-
surements in quantum mechanics includes two aspects: (1) measurement
results are definite, and distributed statistically according to the Born rule;
and (2) the system is collapsed into a corresponding eigenstate of the mea-
sured observable. Different insolubility theorems focus on different aspects
of this phenomenology. All more recent theorems focus on the impossibility
of reproducing (the statistics of) definite pointer readings. Instead, von Neu-
mann’s formulation of the theorem is in terms of reproducing (the statistics
of) the collapse of the state of the system. The focus on collapse may be
7A probably not quite exhaustive list includes Wigner (1963), d’Espagnat (1966), Ear-
man and Shimony (1968), Fine (1970), d’Espagnat (1971, Sections 14-1, 14-2, 15-3 and
15-5), Fehrs and Shimony (1974), Shimony (1974), Brown (1986), Busch and Shimony
(1996), Stein (1997), and Bassi and Ghirardi (2000). Most of these theorems concern
measurements of discrete projection-valued (PV) observables (possibly including errors
and disturbance). The only exceptions are the two theorems in Busch and Shimony (1996),
which establish insolubility also for measurements of continuous PV observables and for
measurements of arbitrary positive-operator-valued (POV) observables, respectively. (For
a general reference to POV observables, see Busch, Grabowski and Lahti (1995).)
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inessential in von Neumann’s proof,8 but we shall be making essential use of
it for our own proof in the next section.
Another difference between von Neumann’s theorem (or at least his verbal
statement of the problem) and most of the later theorems was pointed out
by Brown (1986). Brown noted that (with one exception) all authors writing
on insolubility after von Neumann and up to 1986 had focused on showing
the impossibility of the following type of claim:
(ii’) There exists a measurement scheme (H, U, ρ) such that for all |ψ〉 there
is a decomposition of the final state of system and apparatus in which
the apparatus has a macroscopically well-defined reading.9
Ruling out (ii’) would seem a straightforward way of ruling out that the
phenomenology of measurements can be recovered in a model consisting of a
unitarily interacting system and apparatus (and indeed it does). However, it
is important to keep in mind that such a model would provide a solution to
the measurement problem if and only if the relevant decomposition of the final
state is ignorance-interpretable. The conceptual clarity of von Neumann’s
approach lies precisely in his asking whether we can trace the origin of any
ignorance in the final state of the total system to ignorance in the initial
state of the apparatus. If we do so in the case of (ii’) (at least if we assume
that the initial state of the system is pure10), we see that (ii’) is equivalent to
the claim we labelled as (ii) in the last section. That is, we are allowing the
8Von Neumann assumes the orthogonality of the states |ψn〉 ⊗ |ϕn〉 in the relevant de-
composition of the final state. Thus, he could have easily phrased his result in terms of the
orthogonal pointer states |ϕn〉, rather than the collapsed states |ψn〉 of the system. Indeed,
if one does so, von Neumann’s proof generalises to the case of disturbing measurements
(i. e. where the system is collapsed into some disturbed states |ψ˜n〉). As a matter of fact,
von Neumann’s proof generalises even to the case of approximate measurements (where
the final distribution is only approximately given by the squared moduli of the coefficients
in the initial state |ψ〉) — since even in an approximate measurement one requires some
dependence of the final distribution on the initial state of the system.
9Depending on the theorem in question, perhaps the triple (H, U, ρ) satisfies some
further minimal constraint to justify labelling it indeed a ‘measurement scheme’; perhaps
the result holds only for almost all |ψ〉; perhaps the apparatus has a definite reading only
with probability close to 1; etc.
10If the initial state of the system is not pure, then in general we can no longer trace an
ignorance in the final state to ignorance of the initial apparatus state alone.
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relevant decomposition of the state of the apparatus (describing the possible
states the apparatus might be in) to depend on the state of the system to be
measured, which, as we said, is a conspiratorial scenario.
Thus, while ruling out (ii’) rules out also our claim (iii), and thus proves
the insolubility of the measurement problem also in von Neumann’s sense,
Brown wonders whether the focus on claims of type (ii’) might not be con-
ceptually misleading,11 and in any case focusing on (iii) simplifies the proofs.
Brown singles out Fine (1970) as (implicitly) proving the weaker and con-
ceptually neater result, and presents his own proof as a more explicit version
of the one by Fine.
The more recent proof by Bassi and Ghirardi (2000) also falls into this
category, and is of disarming simplicity and generality. The standard for-
mulations of the measurement problem point out that for an initial super-
position of eigenstates of the measured observable (e.g. electron spin, as in
(3)), the final state of system and apparatus will be a superposition of states
in which the apparatus has different readings. Bassi and Ghirardi reason
in close analogy to this standard argument. They assume that the relevant
decomposition of the initial mixed state of the apparatus (and environment)
is such that, for the vast majority of components (a fraction 1 − ε), a mea-
surement performed on the system in an eigenstate of spin will yield a final
state of system and apparatus (and environment) that counts as including a
macroscopic reading of the corresponding result. They also assume that any
two distinct macroscopic states of system and apparatus (and environment)
are at least approximately orthogonal. Given these assumptions, Bassi and
Ghirardi point out that for a generic initial superposition (3), the vast ma-
jority of components of the initial state of the apparatus (a fraction 1− 2ε)
lead to a final state of system and apparatus (and environment) that fails to
be approximately orthogonal to any of the states that include a macroscopic
reading of spin up or down, and that therefore fails to be macroscopically
well-defined.
11One could be charitable of course, and point out that it might be of independent
interest to rule out also putative models with such ‘conspiratorial’ dependencies on |ψ〉 of
the relevant decomposition of ρ.
7
3 Insolubility from no-signalling
The purpose of this paper is to present an equally simple and general proof
of insolubility, but one that focuses specifically on the impossibility of repro-
ducing the collapse of the state of the system, rather than the definiteness
of measurement results. I shall show that, even for a single state |ψ〉 of the
system, if this state is an entangled state of two spatially separated sub-
systems (say, the singlet state of an EPR pair), it is impossible to reproduce
the collapse of both particles by unitarily interacting locally with only one
particle.
This may sound obvious, and I hope it will be obvious on reflection. One
way to see this is by considering the Bell inequalities. The microscopic state
in the relevant decomposition of ρ plays the role of an apparatus hidden vari-
able, and the unitary evolution is deterministic. From Bell’s original analysis
(Bell 1964), we know that any deterministic hidden variables theory that re-
produces the violation of the Bell inequalities would allow for instantaneous
signalling if one could in principle control the hidden variables. But in the
putative models under consideration the hidden variables are just quantum
states that are elements of the relevant decomposition of ρ, and the dynamics
is just unitary evolution. And there is no way of signalling instantaneously
by implementing on one side of an EPR setup local unitary interactions,
even with suitably controlled quantum states. Thus the models cannot re-
produce violation of the Bell inequalities, and a fortiori they must be unable
to reproduce the collapse and Born rule in general.
We have, however, no need of a detour via the Bell inequalities. The same
conclusion can be established by direct means, and could have been derived
in essence already in the 1930s.12 The details are as follows.
Suppose we prepare a pair of electrons in an entangled state |ψ〉, say, the
singlet state, and we perform a measurement of spin in a given direction on
one of the electrons (say, Alice’s). We now apply (2)–(5) to this case. We
assume there is a decomposition of ρ,
ρ =
∫
Λ
wλρλdλ , (7)
12See also footnote 18 below.
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and a partition
Λ = Λ+ ∪ Λ− (8)
with ∫
Λ+
wλdλ ≈
∫
Λ−
wλdλ ≈ 1
2
(9)
(the statistics of results will actually not enter our argument, so that these
values are immaterial for our purposes), and such that for all λ ∈ Λ±,
U(|ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ ρλ)U−1 = |∓〉〈∓| ⊗ |±〉〈±| ⊗ σ± , (10)
the σ± representing distinct readings of Alice’s apparatus.
More generally, we shall assume that the total system evolves to states
that are indistinguishable from the states on the right-hand side of (10), even
though they might contain some classical or quantum correlations. These
states need not be the same on each run of the experiment, as long as they
are recognisable as indicating the given result. We can also allow for slight
variation (even co-variation) from one run of the experiment to another both
in the initial states |ψ〉 and in the measurement scheme (H, U, ρ), as long as
for the correct proportion of runs a condition of the form (10) holds. Finally,
we can include a further component Λ0 in (8), giving rise to ‘dud runs’ of the
experiment.
Now take any run of Alice’s measurement that has produced the result ‘+’.
The component ρλ of ρ that has led to this result is a state of the apparatus
that will produce the result ‘+’, if Alice couples it to her particle by the
appropriate unitary interaction. Similarly, there exists another state of an
apparatus that will produce the result ‘−’, if Alice couples it to her particle
by an appropriate unitary interaction. Of course, Alice cannot prepare these
apparatus states in practice (she could prepare them in principle by reversing
the time evolution). But we see that there exist states such that, by choosing
to couple her particle to these states by an appropriate unitary interaction,
Alice can produce at will any desired measurement outcome on her particle.
But now, given (10), she can also guarantee that Bob will obtain the opposite
result, if he measures the spin in the same direction on his own particle. Thus,
Alice in principle can use this EPR setup to signal instantaneously to Bob.
But this is impossible: we know from the standard no-signalling theorem
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(Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber 1980) that Alice cannot signal instantaneously
by performing local unitary operations on her side of an EPR setup.
It follows that using statistical mixtures of apparatus states to recover
collapse behaviour — even if it were possible in the case of measurements on
single particles — must fail to recover the collapse of the state of the distant
particle in an EPR experiment.
4 Einstein’s ‘insolubility’ argument
The above proof is extremely simple, and it would be quite remarkable if
it were new. But I do not believe the proof is quite new. In fact, I see it
essentially as a variant of the reasoning that Einstein developed in the run-up
to the EPR paper (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 1935). This is perhaps not
so evident from the text of the paper itself, but becomes much more so if
one reads Einstein’s own explanation of his reasoning to Schro¨dinger in their
correspondence from the summer of 1935.13
On 19 June 1935, Einstein writes to Schro¨dinger to thank him for his
comments on the EPR paper,14 but explains that, since the actual paper
had been written by Podolsky (‘for language reasons’), what Einstein had
actually wanted had ‘not come out so well’, and the main issue was ‘so to
speak buried in learnedness’.
Before turning to the quantum mechanical case, Einstein discusses a clas-
sical example consisting of two boxes that can be opened and inspected as to
whether they contain a single ball (i. e. only one or the other of the boxes is
13Extracts of this correspondence are well-known from the discussions by Fine (1981)
and by Howard (1985, 1990). The correspondence has now been published in full (in the
original German) as part of the extensive selection of Schro¨dinger’s correspondence edited
by von Meyenn (2011). The following translations of passages from Einstein’s letter of
19 June are by Elise Crull and myself. We are currently preparing a volume including
commentary and translations of original materials relating to the 1935 debate on the EPR
paper, focusing especially on some of its lesser known aspects (Bacciagaluppi and Crull,
in preparation).
14Einstein to Schro¨dinger, 19 June 1935, Archive for the History of Quantum Physics,
microfilm 92, section 2-107 (in German); von Meyenn (2011), vol. 2, pp. 537–539.
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found to be full on each run of the ‘experiment’). He then asks whether the
statement ‘The probability that the ball is in the first box is 1
2
’ is a complete
description of the state of the system. If one denies it (‘Bornian’ view), one
holds that the ball is in fact in one of the boxes, and the given state descrip-
tion is statistical.15 If one maintains that it is complete (‘Schro¨dingerian’
view), then the statistics of the measurement results are introduced only
by the act of measurement. If one does not care about the reality of the
ball (‘Talmudist’ view), this distinction between complete and incomplete
descriptions is held to be meaningless. While in this everyday example the
statistical view appears to be the only natural one, if one wishes to argue
against the ‘Talmudist’, according to Einstein one needs a supplementary
principle:
the second box, together with everything that pertains to its con-
tents, is independent of what happens with respect to the first
box (separate subsystems).
The argument so far, including Einstein’s introduction of the ‘separation
principle’, has been thoroughly and convincingly discussed in the existing
literature — except for one small detail of Einstein’s description of the
‘Schro¨dingerian’ view, which reads as follows, and to which we shall return
later:
The statistics only come about through insufficiently known fac-
tors foreign to the described system, which are introduced by the
observation.
Einstein then goes on to discuss the quantum mechanical case:
One describes in quantum theory a real state of a system by
a (normalised) function ψ of the coordinates (of configuration
space). The time evolution is univocally given through the Schro¨d-
inger eq[uation]. One would now like to say the following: ψ cor-
responds bi-univocally to the real state of the real system. The
15That is, it describes an ensemble of systems, half of which are in one state and half in
the other.
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statistical character of the measurement outcomes is accounted
for exclusively in terms of the measurement apparatus, or the
process of measurement. If this works, I speak of a complete
description of reality through the theory. If, however, such an
interpretation is not feasible, I call the theoretical description
‘incomplete’.
Note that what counts here for Einstein as a complete description in terms of
quantum mechanics (which Einstein’s argument aims to show is impossible)
is a picture in which: (a) wave functions are in bijective correspondence
with the real states of the system; (b) they evolve according to the unitary
Schro¨dinger equation; (c) the statistical distribution of results is introduced
only through the measurement process.16
Einstein then describes a generic EPR setup, with an entangled state
ψAB =
∑
mn
cmnψm(x1)χn(x2) (11)
of two systems A and B. Performing measurements of two alternative ob-
servables on subsystem A yields different wave functions ψB or ψB for B.
But, as Einstein observes:
The real state of B now cannot depend on what measurement I
perform on A (‘separation hypothesis’ above).
Thus, the assumption of completeness contradicts the separation principle.
I suggest now that one could read the above condition (c) — that the
statistics are introduced through the measurement process — in the same
sense used by von Neumann: that (while all interactions are unitary) the
exact details of the measurement process are unknown, and that it is for this
reason that the results of the measurement are only statistically determined.
This is after all the way measurement statistics are introduced in Einstein’s
16One can perhaps say that a complete theory needs to describe not only the real states
of a system, but also its dynamics (both when the system is isolated and when it is subject
to measurement).
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parallel ball-in-a-box example, so the analogy is close at hand. If we read
Einstein thus,17 then we can gloss the ensuing contradiction in terms of insol-
ubility: under the assumption of bijective correspondence of wave functions
to real states, unitary quantum mechanics cannot reproduce the full phe-
nomenology of measurement by invoking an imperfectly known initial state
of the apparatus (and is in this sense incomplete)!
Before concluding, it will be useful to examine two (related) aspects un-
der which the ‘insolubility’ reading of Einstein’s incompleteness argument
and the argument given in the previous section are disanalogous. Einstein’s
argument considers two alternative measurements performed on subsystem
A, while we considered the same kind of measurement, but with two different
microscopic initial states for Alice’s apparatus. Thus, on this reading, Ein-
stein focuses on what Alice can do in practice, while our argument needs to
invoke what she can do in principle. On the other hand, in our case the effect
on Bob’s side contradicts the no-signalling theorem, which follows from uni-
tarity. In Einstein’s case (precisely because the no-signalling theorem holds!)
the effect on Bob’s side cannot be an instance of signalling, and in order
to derive a contradiction Einstein needs to invoke the full-blown separation
principle.18
Einstein’s separation principle in fact is so strong that it allows one to
derive a contradiction whether or not one assumes a unitary interaction be-
tween Alice’s system and her apparatus, or even whether or not one assumes
that the evolution of the system upon measurement is deterministic. (This of
17I am not claiming that this is the correct historical reading of Einstein’s argument.
Indeed, it is not an aspect that returns explicitly in later presentations of his incomplete-
ness argument (although I see nothing in the later presentations that would exclude this
reading). I am only suggesting that there is a possible analogy between certain aspects
of Einstein’s incompleteness argument and certain aspects of von Neumann’s insolubility
argument (and by extension certain aspects of our argument in section 3).
18According to Howard (1985), Einstein’s separation principle is to be analysed in terms
of separability (the existence of separate states) and locality (no superluminal influence),
a distinction which Einstein starts making explicitly by 1946 or 1947. In terms of this
distinction, another way of expressing the above disanalogy is to say that if one focuses
on what Alice can do in principle, one can derive a contradiction with the weaker locality
principle, while if one focuses on what Alice can do in practice, the contradiction will be
only with the full separation principle. This may be a less anachronistic way of making the
comparison, since as far as I am aware the no-signalling theorem was formulated explicitly
only in 1980 by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber.
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course helps to hide the analogy with von Neumann’s insolubility argument,
which refers explicitly to unitary interaction.)
Note finally that if one assumes a deterministic but nonlinear interaction
between Alice’s system and her measuring apparatus, then in order to derive
signalling there is no need to consider what Alice could do in principle. As
Gisin (1989) famously showed, if such a theory allows Alice to reproduce
the collapse and Born rule of quantum mechanics also on Bob’s side, then
Bob will be able in practice to use the nonlinearity in the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion to distinguish locally on his side between the different decompositions
of the reduced state of his system corresponding to the different possible
measurements performed by Alice.19
5 Conclusion
This paper was prompted by an engaging and provocative talk by Theo
Nieuwenhuizen,20 presenting the model of spin measurements developed by
Allahverdyan, Balian and Nieuwenhuizen (2011). At first, I thought this
model was an attempt at doing precisely what is precluded by the insolubil-
ity results. A careful reading of the 160-page paper, however, makes it clear
that the authors — in fact, like Einstein — reject an interpretation of the
wave function as a complete description of an individual system.21 Moreover,
19The result is presented perhaps even more strikingly in Gisin (1990). It should be
emphasised that (as Gisin realises perfectly well) the assumption from which signalling is
derived, namely that a given theory with a nonlinear Schro¨dinger equation reproduce the
standard predictions of quantum mechanics, is extremely strong and perhaps impossible
to satisfy. See Doebner and Goldin (1996) and Bacciagaluppi (2012), respectively, for two
explicit examples of nonlinear theories that do not exhibit signalling, or at least not for
all entangled states.
20At the conference on ‘Emergent Quantum Mechanics’, University of Vienna, 11–13
November 2011.
21Under an alternative ‘minimal’ or ‘statistical’ interpretation of the theory — in the
sense adopted by the above authors — the measurement problem could be said not to
arise. Such an interpretation, however, throws open further weighty questions — of why
and how in the context of macroscopic measurements we appear to have observational
access to an individual description, and of whether and how this individual description
extends also to a ‘sub-quantum’ level.
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the paper shows explicitly how an arguably realistic model of measurement22
does not exhibit the sensitivity to the state of the measuring apparatus that
would be needed if one wished to explain the phenomenology of measure-
ments through ignorance of the exact initial state of the apparatus. The
mechanism that leads to the final mixture of pointer readings (irrespectively
of the problem of how this mixture should be interpreted) is intuitively that
the apparatus relaxes to different macroscopic equilibrium states for different
eigenstates of the measured observable. Not only does this mechanism not
depend on the exact initial microstate of the apparatus, but the authors show
that the initial apparatus state can even be a pure state, which cannot be
decomposed further (Allahverdyan, Balian and Nieuwenhuizen 2011, section
5.2).23 Thus, the kind of model that the insolubility results rule out does not
even remotely resemble actual detailed models of the interaction between a
system and a piece of apparatus.
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